

EN BANC

[A.M. NO. 2001-9-SC, July 14, 2006]

**DOROTEO IGOY COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. GILBERT F. SORIANO,
RESPONDENT.**

R E S O L U T I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

On October 11, 2001, this Court unanimously ruled to dismiss respondent Atty. Gilbert Soriano from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and leave credits, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government including government-owned or controlled corporations, and indefinitely suspended him from the practice of law. We denied with finality respondent's motion for reconsideration on June 10, 2003.

On March 31, 2006, respondent filed an *Ex-Parte Plea for Clemency and Plea to Lift Order of Suspension from the Practice of Law* alleging that his dismissal from the service and suspension from the practice of law for more than five years now is ample penalty for his transgressions. He claimed that at 61 years of age, he may no longer find gainful employment but as a lawyer, he could still be a productive citizen and family provider. On even date, respondent also filed an *Ex-Parte Motion to Recover Money Equivalent of Respondent's Accrued Leave Credits* which he earned during his 28 years of service in the judiciary.

On May 22, 2006, respondent filed a *Supplement to Ex-Parte Plea for Clemency and Plea to Lift Order of Suspension from the Practice of Law* and submitted certifications attesting to his good moral character issued by (a) Rev. Fr. Ariel O. Tecson, Parish Priest of Our Lady of the Most Holy Rosary Parish, Parañaque City; (b) Sr. Silvana Rescigno of the Franciscan Sisters Adorers of the Cross; (c) Rev. Fr. Christopher Salonga of the Fr. Hannibal Foundation Center in Parañaque City; (d) Rev. Fr. John Lucas of Di-Francia Center of Studies in Parañaque City; (e) Joseph Tan of the Knights of Columbus; and (f) Eduardo Timbungco, Bgy. Secretary of Manuyo Dos, Las Piñas City. At the same time, respondent prayed for the lifting of the prohibition for his re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government including government-owned or controlled corporations.

In fine, respondent is now asking this Court (a) to lift the order suspending him from the practice of law; (b) to release the monetary equivalent of his accrued leave credits; and (c) to lift the order prohibiting his re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government including government-owned or controlled corporation.

Without overlooking respondent's infractions which caused his dismissal from the service and suspension from the practice of law, we take a second look at the penalties imposed upon him.

The suspension of a lawyer is not intended primarily as a punishment, but as a measure of protection of the public and the profession,^[1] the lifting of which is based on the same criterion used by the Court in applications for reinstatement to practice law, that is, whether or not "*the public interest in the orderly and impartial administration of justice will be conserved by the [respondent's] participation therein in the capacity of an attorney and counselor at law.*"^[2] The respondent must, like a candidate for admission to the Bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character – a fit and proper person to practice law. The Court will take into consideration his character and standing prior to the suspension, the nature and character of the charge for which he was suspended, his conduct subsequent thereto, and the time that has elapsed after his suspension.^[3]

In this case, respondent manifests that he is sincerely repentant and deeply remorseful for the wrong he committed having realized that as a lawyer of the Highest Court of the Land, he should have "*lived up to the strictest standards of integrity in the public service bearing in mind that the image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat.*" He also undertakes to always faithfully abide by the ideals, canons and ethics of the legal profession once his suspension is lifted.

Respondent has been suspended from the practice of law since October 11, 2001. Thus, for more than five years, respondent had ample time and opportunity to amend his erring ways and rehabilitate himself as proven by the certifications attesting to his moral character. Thus, he has shown that he is worthy once again to enjoy the privilege of being a member of the Bar. The lifting of the order suspending him from the practice of law is therefore in order.

Similarly, we find merit in respondent's plea for the release of the monetary equivalent of his accrued leave credits. Section 58 of the *Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service* provides in part:

Section 58. *Administrative Disabilities Inherent in Certain Penalties.*

- a. The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it that of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and the perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the government service, unless otherwise provided in the decision.

The above *Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service*, specifically Section 86 thereof, repealed Section 9, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), which provides for the forfeiture of not only the retirement benefits but of the leave credits as well. By so repealing, it must have been the intent of the framers of the Rules to exclude the forfeiture of the latter as one of the penalties inherent in the penalty of dismissal.

In *Villaros v. Orpiano*,^[4] the Court noted that even when the penalty is dismissal, the forfeiture of the leave credits is not imposed by the applicable rule found in Section 58 of the *Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service*. In *Paredes v. Padua*,^[5] the Court held that despite their dismissal from the service,