

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 176019, January 12, 2011]

**BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC., PETITIONER, VS. GOLDEN
POWER DIESEL SALES CENTER, INC. AND RENATO C. TAN,
RESPONDENTS.**

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review^[1] of the 13 March 2006 Decision^[2] and 19 December 2006 Resolution^[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78626. In its 13 March 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc.'s (BPI Family) petition for mandamus and certiorari. In its 19 December 2006 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied BPI Family's motion for reconsideration.

The Facts

On 26 October 1994, CEDEC Transport, Inc. (CEDEC) mortgaged two parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 134327 and 134328 situated in Malibay, Pasay City, including all the improvements thereon (properties), in favor of BPI Family to secure a loan of P6,570,000. On the same day, the mortgage was duly annotated on the titles under Entry No. 94-2878. On 5 April and 27 November 1995, CEDEC obtained from BPI Family additional loans of P2,160,000 and P1,140,000, respectively, and again mortgaged the same properties. These latter mortgages were duly annotated on the titles under Entry Nos. 95-6861 and 95-11041, respectively, on the same day the loans were obtained.

Despite demand, CEDEC defaulted in its mortgage obligations. On 12 October 1998, BPI Family filed with the ex-officio sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City (RTC) a verified petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage over the properties under Act No. 3135, as amended.^[4]

On 10 December 1998, after due notice and publication, the sheriff sold the properties at public auction. BPI Family, as the highest bidder, acquired the properties for P13,793,705.31. On 14 May 1999, the Certificate of Sheriff's Sale, dated 24 February 1999, was duly annotated on the titles covering the properties.

On 15 May 1999, the one-year redemption period expired without CEDEC redeeming the properties. Thus, the titles to the properties were consolidated in the name of BPI Family. On 13 September 2000, the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City issued new titles, TCT Nos. 142935 and 142936, in the name of BPI Family.

However, despite several demand letters, CEDEC refused to vacate the properties

and to surrender possession to BPI Family. On 31 January 2002, BPI Family filed an Ex-Parte Petition for Writ of Possession over the properties with Branch 114 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City (trial court). In its 27 June 2002 Decision, the trial court granted BPI Family's petition.^[5] On 12 July 2002, the trial court issued the Writ of Possession.

On 29 July 2002, respondents Golden Power Diesel Sales Center, Inc. and Renato C. Tan^[6] (respondents) filed a Motion to Hold Implementation of the Writ of Possession.^[7] Respondents alleged that they are in possession of the properties which they acquired from CEDEC on 10 September 1998 pursuant to the Deed of Absolute Sale with Assumption of Mortgage (Deed of Sale).^[8] Respondents argued that they are third persons claiming rights adverse to CEDEC, the judgment obligor and they cannot be deprived of possession over the properties. Respondents also disclosed that they filed a complaint before Branch 111 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-0360, for the cancellation of the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale and an order to direct BPI Family to honor and accept the Deed of Absolute Sale between CEDEC and respondents.^[9]

On 12 September 2002, the trial court denied respondents' motion.^[10] Thereafter, the trial court issued an alias writ of possession which was served upon CEDEC and all other persons claiming rights under them.

However, the writ of possession expired without being implemented. On 22 January 2003, BPI Family filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Order the Honorable Branch Clerk of Court to Issue Alias Writ of Possession. In an Order dated 27 January 2003, the trial court granted BPI Family's motion.

Before the alias writ could be implemented, respondent Renato C. Tan filed with the trial court an Affidavit of Third Party Claim^[11] on the properties. Instead of implementing the writ, the sheriff referred the matter to the trial court for resolution.

On 11 February 2003, BPI Family filed an Urgent Motion to Compel Honorable Sheriff and/or his Deputy to Enforce Writ of Possession and to Break Open the properties. In its 7 March 2003 Resolution, the trial court denied BPI Family's motion and ordered the sheriff to suspend the implementation of the alias writ of possession.^[12] According to the trial court, "the order granting the alias writ of possession should not affect third persons holding adverse rights to the judgment obligor." The trial court admitted that in issuing the first writ of possession it failed to take into consideration respondents' complaint before Branch 111 claiming ownership of the property. The trial court also noted that respondents were in actual possession of the properties and had been updating the payment of CEDEC's loan balances with BPI Family. Thus, the trial court found it necessary to amend its 12 September 2002 Order and suspend the implementation of the writ of possession until Civil Case No. 99-0360 is resolved.

BPI Family filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 20 June 2003 Resolution, the trial court denied the motion.^[13]

BPI Family then filed a petition for mandamus and certiorari with application for a

temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals. BPI Family argued that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ordered the suspension of the implementation of the alias writ of possession. According to BPI Family, it was the ministerial duty of the trial court to grant the writ of possession in its favor considering that it was now the owner of the properties and that once issued, the writ should be implemented without delay.

The Court of Appeals dismissed BPI Family's petition. The dispositive portion of the 13 March 2006 Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant *Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Writ of Certiorari with Application for a TRO and/or Preliminary Injunction* is hereby *DENIED*. The twin *Resolutions* dated March 7, 2003 and June 20, 2003, both issued by the public respondent in LRC Case No. 02-0003, ordering the sheriff to suspend the implementation of the *Alias Writ of Possession* issued in favor of the petitioner, and denying its *Urgent Omnibus Motion* thereof, respectively, are hereby **AFFIRMED**.

SO ORDERED. [14]

BPI Family filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 19 December 2006 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in suspending the implementation of the alias writ of possession because respondents were in actual possession of the properties and are claiming rights adverse to CEDEC, the judgment obligor. According to the Court of Appeals, the principle that the implementation of the writ of possession is a mere ministerial function of the trial court is not without exception. The Court of Appeals held that the obligation of the court to issue an *ex parte* writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale ceases to be ministerial once it appears that there is a third party in possession of the property who is claiming a right adverse to that of the debtor or mortgagor.

The Issues

BPI Family raises the following issues:

A.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE FINDING OF THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT THAT DESPITE THE FACT THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS MERELY STEPPED INTO THE SHOES OF MORTGAGOR CEDEC, BEING THE VENDEE OF THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION, THEY ARE CATEGORIZED AS THIRD PERSONS IN POSSESSION THEREOF WHO ARE CLAIMING A RIGHT

ADVERSE TO THAT OF THE DEBTOR/MORTGAGOR CEDEC.

B.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE AFOREMENTIONED TWIN ORDERS SUSPENDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WRIT OF POSSESSION ON THE GROUND THAT THE ANNULMENT CASE FILED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IS STILL PENDING DESPITE THE ESTABLISHED RULING THAT PENDENCY OF A CASE QUESTIONING THE LEGALITY OF A MORTGAGE OR AUCTION SALE CANNOT BE A GROUND FOR THE NON-ISSUANCE AND/OR NON-IMPLEMENTATION OF A WRIT OF POSSESSION.^[15]

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is meritorious.

BPI Family argues that respondents cannot be considered "a third party who is claiming a right adverse to that of the debtor or mortgagor" because respondents, as vendee, merely stepped into the shoes of CEDEC, the vendor and judgment obligor. According to BPI Family, respondents are mere extensions or successors-in-interest of CEDEC. BPI Family also argues that the pendency of an action questioning the validity of a mortgage or auction sale cannot be a ground to oppose the implementation of a writ of possession.

On the other hand, respondents insist that they are third persons who claim rights over the properties adverse to CEDEC. Respondents argue that the obligation of the court to issue an *ex parte* writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale ceases to be ministerial once it appears that there is a third party in possession of the property who is claiming a right adverse to that of the judgment obligor.

In extrajudicial foreclosures of real estate mortgages, the issuance of a writ of possession is governed by Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, which provides:

SECTION 7. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the Court of First Instance (Regional Trial Court) of the province or place where the property or any part thereof is situated, to give him possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without violating the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of this Act. Such petition shall be made under oath and filed in form of an *ex parte* motion in the registration or cadastral proceedings if the property is registered, or in special proceedings in the case of property registered under the Mortgage Law or under section one hundred and ninety-four of the Administrative Code, or of any other real property encumbered with a mortgage duly registered in the office of any register of deeds in accordance with any existing law, and in each case the clerk of the court shall, upon the filing of such petition, collect the