526 Phil. 594

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 142848, June 30, 2006]

EUGENE C. YU, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF TAGAYTAY CITY, BRANCH 18, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR JOSE M. VELASCO, SEC. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, RODOLFO OCHOA AND REYNALDO DE LOS SANTOS A.K.A. "ENGINE," RESPONDENTS.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

In the evening of 14 November 1994, Atty. Eugene Tan, former President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and his driver Eduardo Constantino were abducted by several persons in Alabang, Muntinlupa, and brought somewhere in Cavite where they were both shot to death. At about 5:00 oï¿½clock in the afternoon of 17 November 1994, the bodies of the two victims were dug up in a shallow grave at Barangay Malinta, Sampaloc 2, Dasmariñas Cavite.[1] Charged to investigate the abduction and killing was the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC). After having conducted a thorough investigation of the case, the PACC filed charges before the Department of Justice (DOJ) entitled, "*Task Force Cabakid v. Pedro Lim, Bonifacio Roxas, Sgt. Edgar Allan Abalon, Mariano Hizon, Eugenio Hizon and John Does.*" The same was docketed as I-S. No. 94-557 and was assigned to a panel of Senior State Prosecutors of the DOJ. Later events that transpired as narrated by herein petitioner Eugene Yu are not disputed.

> On December 13, 1994, the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a Resolution (***Annex "C", ibid.***) in the preliminary investigation of the case, docketed as I.S. No. 94-557 finding probable cause against Messrs. Pedro Lim, Bonifacio Rojas, Capt. Alfredo Abad, Toto Mirasol, Venerando Ozores, Mariano Hizon, Eugenio Hizon and private respondents de los Santos and Ochoa for the kidnapping and murder of the late Atty. Eugene Tan and his driver, Eduardo Constantino. Petitioner and his wife, Patricia Lim-Yu, were also named respondents in I.S. No. 94-557. The charges against them however were dropped for lack of evidence to establish probable cause. Thereafter, an information was filed against several accused, namely private respondents Rodolfo Ochoa and Reynaldo de los Santos among others, before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, of Tagaytay City presided by respondent judge. On December 16 and 17, 1994 after the information was filed and while under custody of the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC), private respondents Ochoa and de los Santos executed separate sworn statements (***Annexes "D" and "E,", ibid.***) implicating petitioner in the abduction and killing of Atty. Eugene Tan and Eduardo Constantino. The PACC re-filed the complaint docketed as I.S. No. 94-614 for murder and kidnapping against

petitioner. During the preliminary investigation, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the charges, citing that the sworn statements of private respondents were not only inadmissible in evidence but also failed to establish probable cause against him. On January 30, 1995, the DOJ investigating panel composed of Senior State Prosecutors Henrick Guingoyon and Ferdinand Abesamis denied petitioner's motion to dismiss (***Annex "F", ibid.***). Thereafter, three (3) separate informations were filed against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, of Tagaytay City. Simultaneously, petitioner filed with the aforesaid court an omnibus motion to determine probable cause, to deny issuance of warrant of arrest and to quash information (***Annex "G", ibid.***).

On December 8, 1995, respondent judge issued a resolution (**Annex "H," ibid.**), the dispositive portion reads:

> x x x x
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> "WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, this Court finds that probable cause exists against accused Eugene Yu as an accomplice in the instant cases, and the prosecution is accordingly directed to amend the informations filed in these cases for the inclusion of the same accused as an accomplice within ten (10) days upon receipt of a copy hereof. As a consequence, let a warrant for the arrest of Eugene Yu be issued in these cases and bail for his provisional liberty is hereby fixed at P60,000.00 each in theses cases.
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> "x x x x
>
> "SO ORDERED." (Rollo, pp. 6; 118-119)

Both the prosecution and the petitioner filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the aforequoted resolution. The prosecution sought to maintain the original informations charging petitioner as principal, while the latter sought the dismissal of the cases against him for lack of probable cause. Both motions were denied in an order of the court ***a quo*** dated February 6, 1996 (***Annex "I", ibid.***).

In a petition for certiorari, docketed before the Supreme Court as G.R. No. 124380 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Hon. Eleuterio F. Guerrero, et al.," the prosecution impugned the Resolution dated December 8, 1995 and the Order dated February 6, 1996. The petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court in its Resolution dated May 14, 1996. The prosecution refiled the same titled petition before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 42208, "where it is currently pending, entitled: People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Eleuterio F. Guerrero, et al."

In the meantime, the prosecution filed a "Petition to Discharge as State Witnesses and Exclude from the Information accused Ochoa and de los Santos" on April 17, 1996 (***Annex "J"***). Petitioner opposed the motion. On March 6, 1997, respondent judge issued the impugned order, thus:

"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises and considerations, this Court hereby resolves to GRANT the Petition (to Discharge as State Witnesses & Exclude from the Information Accused Ochoa & de los Santos) filed by the prosecution for being impressed with merit, and, accordingly, the same accused are hereby ordered discharged and excluded from the information filed in these cases as State Witnesses.

"SO ORDERED." (***Annex "A", p. 31***)

Petitioner, who is one of the accused in the aforementioned criminal cases, claims that the orders were issued by public respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, claiming that there is no legal basis or justification to discharge as state witnesses accused Rodolfo Ochoa and Reynaldo de los Santos (**hereinafter referred to as private respondents**).[2]

From the Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagaytay City, Branch 18 dated 6 March 1997, petitioner filed a Petition for *Certiorari* and prohibition before the Court of Appeals.[3] In a decision[4] dated 30 September 1999, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied in a resolution dated 4 April 2000.[5]

Essentially, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no necessity for a hearing to determine a person's qualification as a state witness after the DOJ had attested to his qualification. Republic Act No. 6981,[6] Witness Protection and Security Benefit Program (WPSBP), conferred upon the DOJ the sole authority to determine whether or not an accused is qualified for admission into the program. The appellate court held that under Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6981, upon the filing by the prosecution of a petition to discharge an accused from the information, it is mandatory for the court to order the discharge and exclusion of the accused.[7]

From this adverse decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals, petitioner filed the instant petition.

The following issues are raised for resolution[8]:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE DISCHARGE OF AN ACCUSED IS NOT A JUDICIAL FUNCTION.

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT CONSIDER THAT THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DISCHARGED THE ACCUSED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PRESENT EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO BE DISCHARGED AS STATE WITNESS.

Petitioner maintains that since the private respondents were already charged along with the other accused including him (petitioner) before they were admitted to the WPSBP, their admission is a judicial prerogative which requires prior determination

by the trial court of their qualification as state witnesses, in accordance with Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.

Petitioner further asserts that the case of *Webb v. De Leon*,[9] which the RTC relied on in granting the discharge of the private respondents and their admission to the WPSBP, does not apply. In that case, Jessica Alfaro was not charged as a respondent before her application and admission to the WPSBP. Thus, the issue of whether or not she can be discharged from the information upon the filing of the petition for discharge never arose. On the other hand, petitioner contends in this case that the private respondents were already charged along with the other accused, including him, before they were admitted to the WPSBP and discharged as an accused to be utilized as a state witness. Petitioner argues that if this were to be allowed, the same is tantamount to permitting the prosecution to supplant with its own the court's exercise of discretion on how a case over which it has acquired jurisdiction, will proceed.

The argument of petitioner fails to persuade.

Pertinent provision of Republic Act No. 6981 employed by the prosecution in the discharge of the private respondents reads:

> SEC. 3. *Admission into the Program.* – Any person who has witnessed or has knowledge or information on the commission of a crime and has testified or is testifying or about to testify before any judicial or quasi-judicial body, or before any investigating authority, may be admitted into the Program:
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> *Provided,* That:
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> a) the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined under the Revised Penal Code, or its equivalent under special laws;
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> b) his testimony can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
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> c) he or any member of his family within the second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity is subjected to threats to his life or bodily injury or there is a likelihood that he will be killed, forced, intimidated, harassed or corrupted to prevent him from testifying, or to testify falsely, or evasively, because or on account of his testimony; and
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> d) he is not a law enforcement officer, even if he would be testifying against other law enforcement officers. In such a case, only the immediate members of his family may avail themselves of the protection provided for under this Act.
>
> If the Department, after examination of said applicant and other relevant facts, is convinced that the requirements of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations have been complied with, it shall admit said applicant to the Program, require said witness to execute a sworn statement detailing his knowledge or information on the commission of the crime, and thereafter issue the proper certification. For purposes of

this Act, any such person admitted to the Program shall be known as the Witness.

x x x x

SEC. 10. *State Witness.* – Any person who has participated in the commission of a crime and desires to be a witness for the State, can apply and, if qualified as determined in this Act and by the Department, shall be admitted into the Program whenever the following circumstances are present:

a) the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined under the Revised Penal Code or its equivalent under special laws;

b) there is absolute necessity for his testimony;

c) there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed;

d) his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points;

e) he does not appear to be most guilty; and

f) he has not at any time been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.

An accused discharged from an information or criminal complaint by the court in order that he may be a State Witness pursuant to Sections 9 and 10 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court may upon his petition be admitted to the Program if he complies with the other requirements of this Act. Nothing in this Act shall prevent the discharge of an accused, so that he can be used as a State Witness under Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court.

On the other hand, Rule 119, Section 17, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, upon which petitioner relies reads:

Section 17. *Discharge of accused to be state witness.* – When two or more persons are jointly charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state when, after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the court is satisfied that:

(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;

(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;