

SEVENTH DIVISION

[CA-G.R. SP No. 125852, May 28, 2014]

**JIMENO DYSIONG, PETITIONER, VS. EWELL SQUARE, INC.,
RESPONDENT.**

D E C I S I O N

REYES-CARPIO, A., J.:

This is a Petition for Review,^[1] filed under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, asking this Court to take another look at the Decision,^[2] dated December 28, 2011, rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 88 in Civil Case No. Q-10-568418 entitled "Ewell Square, Inc. vs. Jimeno Dysiong," the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the court *a quo* dated October 6, 2010 is hereby affirmed *en toto*. However, in view of the supervening event of abandonment of the subject premises, the motion to restore possession of the leased premises as well as the urgent motion for ocular inspection filed by the defendant-appellee are rendered moot and academic.

SO ORDERED."^[3]

The instant case stemmed from a Complaint,^[4] dated January 11, 2010, filed by herein respondent Ewell Square, Inc. (Ewell, for brevity) for ejectment, collection of unpaid rentals and damages against petitioner Jimeno Dysiong.

Respondent alleged that it was the owner of an apartment located at 161-A Biak na Bato St. cor. Del Monte Ave., Quezon City which was leased by petitioner on a monthly basis at the rate of P8,400.00. According to respondent, starting July 2009, petitioner failed to pay rentals and as of January 5, 2010, the amount due was P58,800.00.

Despite a demand letter, dated December 9, 2009, sent by respondent requiring petitioner to vacate and pay rentals, the latter still refused to surrender the premises, leading to the filing of the complaint.

In his Answer,^[5] petitioner admitted to being a lessee of the subject premises since 1984 at the alleged monthly rate of P8,400.00 but denied its nature as a monthly contract. Petitioner further alleged that the lease contract was initially with the previous owner of the property, Restituto Ingal. It was further contended that the property was not owned by respondent but rather, by Douglas Tan, as shown by the demand sent to the petitioner. The non-payment of rentals was also denied by petitioner as he further averred that the eviction was part of respondent's scheme to harass tenants and effectively turn over its possession to Ewell.

Petitioner also questioned the absence of a Board Resolution sufficiently showing the authority of Douglas Tan to institute the complaint and sought to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

After weighing the arguments and evidence presented before it, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City, Branch 41 rendered its Decision,^[6] dated October 6, 2010, dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction, ruling in this wise:

"A perusal of the record and the pieces of evidence submitted by both parties show that the emphasized underscored ground for judicial ejectment-failure to pay rental arrearages for a total of three (3) months – was not established by plaintiff. The original copy of O.R. No. 1625 dated 5 January 2007 issued by the former owner, Mr. Restituto Ingal to defendant states: PAYMENT OF JANUARY up to DECEMBER 2009 ADVANCE RENT in the AMOUNT OF P302,400.00. The said receipt clearly shows that when plaintiff gave a written demand letter dated 9 December 2009 to defendant to pay his back rentals from July 2009, it was barely twelve (12) days only after the last payment of defendant. As such, plaintiff did not comply with the 3-month arrearages requirement to justify a lessor to eject a lessee.

Subject matter of this case is the rental starting July 2009 to December 2009. The subsequent payment of defendant of his monthly rental after December 2009 by way of consignation to the bank is not a litigated issue herein. The court therefore opts not to resolve the same.

It appears that it was only on 9 December 2009 when defendant was officially informed that plaintiff is the new owner of the property in question. No proof was ever presented by plaintiff to show that defendant was informed about the sale of the property from its previous order (sic).

There is nothing under the law to prevent a Vendee who steps into the shoes of the original owner from objecting said lessee on the grounds provided by law. In the case at bar, the court finds that when the former owner-lessor sold the property to herein plaintiff the leased period has not yet expired.

On this score, Section 10 of R.A. No. 9653 provides that no lessor or his successor-in-interest shall be entitled to eject the lessee upon the ground that the leased premises have been sold or mortgaged to a third person regardless of whether the lease or mortgage is registered or not.

As soon as plaintiff purchased the property subject of this case he stepped into the shoes of the previous owner (previous lessor of herein defendant) and he assumed all rights and obligations of the previous owner including the obligation to recognize and respect the existing lease of the previous lessor and defendant. In *Garcia v. Court of Appeals* the Supreme Court held that the owner's successor-in-interest must respect an existing contract of lease. Any attempt to eject the lessee within the period of lease constitutes a breach of contract. In other words, the owners' successor-in-interest must respect an existing contract of lease where the lease period is still running.

All told, the filing of this ejectment case was premature. In view of the premature filing of this case, this court did not thereby acquire jurisdiction over the ejectment [case] filed by herein plaintiff. The defendant, therefore, cannot be held liable for the payment of damages and attorney's fees.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered **DISMISSING** the instant case for lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.^[7]

Aggrieved, respondent elevated the case to the RTC and pending such appeal, petitioner filed a Motion to Restore Possession of the Leased Premises,^[8] dated July 11, 2011, alleging that the former started renovations on the building housing the unit leased by the latter, resulting to the blockage of his entrance to the said unit.

On August 25, 2011, petitioner also filed an incident report with the Station Intelligence and Investigation Branch of the La Loma Police Station, the pertinent portion of which reads:

"At this time and date one, **JIMENO DYSIONG y UY**, 68 years old, married, businessman, Native of Bicol and residing at No. 128 Biak na Bato St., corner Del Monte Avenue, Barangay Siena, Quezon City, personally appeared to this Station and requested an incident to be placed on record. That on or about 3:00 p.m., 18 August 2011, at reportee's given address. His lawyer ATTY. CEPRIANO P. MARIANO, counsel of herein reportee together with barangay Captain Aple Castor of Barangay Siena, Quezon City, discovered on 23 August, 2011, that reportee's rented apartment allegedly forcibly open (sic) the door and the key is under the custody of herein reportee. That upon discovery of reportee's lawyer together with the Barangay Chairman, a certain security guard BORJA, detailed thereat, showed allegedly entered in his logbook that certain **JERRY MONTERO**, pulled out all items in the apartment at about 1420H same date (August 18, 2011). Reportee further claimed that during the process his lawyer asked the guard BORJA, to show any authorization from herein reportee authorizing MR. MONTERO to pulled (sic) out the items but he could not show one. Reportee further avverred (sic) that according to security guard BORJA, that it was SG. ORLANDO BULAWAN, who allowed the pulling out of items to (sic) MR. JERRY MONTERO."^[9]

Petitioner further asked the RTC to cite respondent and/or Douglas Tan for contempt.^[10] According to petitioner, despite the MeTC ruling in his favor, on March 31, 2011, respondent proceeded to fence the entrance to the premises leased by petitioner thus, blocking the same. Resultantly, petitioner filed a complaint with the barangay. Petitioner alleged that the barangay chairperson informed him that Douglas Tan claimed that the ejectment case against petitioner had already been terminated leading to the issuance of the permit for the construction of the premises. Petitioner argued that respondent misrepresented the true status of the case to the barangay authorities as the same was still pending appeal, warranting contempt of court.